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IT IS WELL-ESTABLISHED that discount rate
changes of the same size can have markedly
different effects on market interest rates.
Studies of such effects, starting with Thornton
(1982), have generally divided discount rate
changes into two groups: “technical” changes,
those made solely to keep the discount rate in
line with market rates, and other “non-technical”
changes.’ The former generally do not have a
signitIcant impact on market rates, while the
latter generally do. The use of this technical/
non-technical dichotomy is predicated on the
assumption that the market responds to a
discount rate change based on the reasons fot’
the change. Hakkio and Pearce (1992) find that
the reasons generally fall into three categories:
“(1) conditions in the market for bank reserves
- .; (2) movements in intermediate targets such
as the money supply and the foreign exchange
value of the dollar; and (3) movements in ultimate
tat-gets such as inflation and economic growth.”
They observe that “changes in the rate because
of type (1) factors are likely to be used to com-
plement open market operations, while changes
because of type (2) or (3) factors are more likely
to be used as signals of future Fed policy.”~
Thus, technical changes result when the oppor-
tunity cost to banks of borrowing reserves—the
federal funds rate less the discount rate—is too
high or low to be consistent with attaining the
Fed’s operating target. Since October 1982 that
target has been the level of borrowed reserves.3
Non-technical changes, on the other hand,
encompass all of the other reasons the Fed
might change the discount rate. Clearly a combi-
nation of the factors identified by Flakkio and
Pearce can be behind a given discount rate
change, so the reaction of market interest rates
to discount rate changes might be more heter-
ogeneous than the technical/non-technical
dichotomy would suggest. Moreover, as the
efficient markets hypothesis implies, the
response of market interest rates to a discount
rate change should vary with the amount of
new information the discount change imparts
regarding the Fed’s policy intentions or the state
of the economy in general.~
This article presents results on the differential
response of market interest rates to discount
1The technicallnon-technical dichotomy has subsequently
appeared in analyses of the effects of discount rate changes
on interest rates [Roley and Troll (1984), Smirlock and
Yawitz (1985), Thornton (1986, 1991), Cook and Hahn (1988)]
and exchange rates [Batten and Thornton (1984)].
2Hakkio and Pearce (1992), pp. 56-57.
3Thornton (1988) discusses under what conditions targeting
borrowed reserves is equivalent to targeting the tederal
funds rate. The Fed’s operating target was the federal funds
rate throughout the 1970s until October 1979 when the Fed
began to target non-borrowed reserves.
~Itis not surprising that the theoretical links between the
discount rate and market interest rates have found empirical
support in previous studies, given that from 1973 to 1989,
for example, 6.2% of the variation in the T-bilI rate took
place on only 1.3% of the days, the 56 days when the
discount rate changed.rate changes using an econometric framework
that explains more heterogeneous responses in
market interest rates than the technical/non-
technical dichotomy allows. The mixture model
employed here assumes that the market response
is determined by either a “high-response” or
‘low-response” data-generating process- Inferences
about which process governs a given period’s
interest rate depend on the information policy-
makers cite when they change the discount
rate. Thus, we can consider hypotheses like
‘the higher the unemployment rate, the larger
the response of market interest rates to a
discount rate change of a given size” With the
technical/non-technical dichotomy, in contrast,
a discount rate change is described as non-
technical if the Fed mentions any number of
things in its announcement, such as the inflation
rate, unemployment rate, industrial production,
money growth rate, etc. The technical/non-
technical dichotomy tells us little about the
relative importance of these individual factors.
A principal aim of the mixture model employed
here is to study the influence these individual
factors have on the market response.
This paper also includes some conjectural
interpretations of the empirical results. For
example, if the market rates respond strongly to
discount rate changes when the unemployment
rate is high, one might conclude that the market
believes that the Fed will consistently change
monetary policy in reaction to shifts in the
unemployment rate. Objectively, however, the
mixture model’s fit and forecasts of the interest
rate response serve as measures of its perform-
ance relative to the standard technical/non-
technical dichotomy. The second half of the
paper addresses the implication of the efficient
markets hypothesis that a discount rate change
must be “news” for market rates to respond by
testing whether the timing of discount rate
changes is sufficiently predictable to require
that models of the market’s response to
discount rate changes distinguish explicitly
between anticipated and unanticipated changes.
Given the limited number of discount rate
changes (only 56 from 1973 to 1989), the model
estimates two levels of response of 90-day
Treasury bills to discount rate changes. ‘The yield
on T-bills is chosen because of the important
role it plays in calculating present values for
stock dividends, bond coupons, annuities, housing
rents, etc.3 While the statistical model assumes
that one of two mutually exclusive processes
generates the change in the T-bill rate from any
given discount rate change, the two response
levels, “high” and “low,” should be understood
as upper and lower bounds where all fitted
responses are a probability-weighted combina-
tion of the two boundary values.” For example,
if A’I’B is the change in the T-bill rate, ADR is
the change in the discount rate and e is a mean-
zero stochastic disturbance, then the mixture
model estimates two data-generating processes,
Process 1: ATB, =
Process 2: ATB~ = /30+j32ADR÷E,
where ~ is greater than j3,, so that Process 2
governs the highest responses. A single equation
can describe the mixture model if we define a
dummy variable, S~which equals one if Process 1
holds and zero if Process 2 holds.
(1) ATB, = /~0+fi,S,ADR,+/3~(i —S)ADR,+ç
Equation Ii samixture model because the
dependent variable is assumed to be drawn
from a mixture of data-generating processes,
in this case two.7 Because we do not observe
5,, only probabilistic inferences about its value
are forthcoming. Hence, the inferred value of
can lie anywhere between zero and one,
making the mixture model more general than
the technical/non-technical dichotomy, which
restricts 5, to equal either zero or one.
~Thisis because the T-bill rate serves as, or at least proxies,
the “risk-free” rate of return. Applications of the term struc-
ture theory of interest rates also treat the T-bill rate as an
anchor, whose current and expected future values largely
determine longer-term interest rates, which are relevant for
investment decisions and the level of economic activity.
Portfolio insurance, through the writing and buying of
options, is another activity that must constantly refer to the
T-bill rate; options must be priced such that riskless
hedges, which create synthetic riskiess assets, do not vio-
late arbitrage bounds relative to T-biil yields.
6The assumption that there are only two response levels is
not to be taken literally. It is a convenient way to estimate
upper and lower bounds for the T-bill response and thus
generate, through mixtures of the two levels, a continuum
of response levels the model can explain, while estimating
only a few parameters. Of course, some responses will lie
outside these bounds: the difference is simply part of the
residual and not explained by the econometric model.
7See Quandt and Ramsey (1978).Table 1
Mixture Model Coefficients
Furthermore, since a primary objective is to
use the mixture model to create one-step-ahead
forecasts of the T-bill response to discount rate
changes, we pay special attention to the prior
probabilities of Process 1 relative to Process 2.
In particular we examine whether the prior
probabilities are constant or whether they vary
according to the magnitude of the discount
change, previous discount rate changes, or
various indicators of economic activity like infla-
tion, output, unemployment, etc. Such variables
(denoted Z) might indicate whether financial
markets believe that the Fed is actively changing
policy in response to economic conditions.
Because drawing inferences about the likelihood
of Process I vs. Process 2 is analogous to draw-
ing inferences from a logit model, the logistic
function provides a useful parameterization of
the prior probability of Process 1:”
(2) Prob(S,= lIZ) = exp(ZçO)
I + exp(Z0)
where all elements of Z, at-c known at time t — 1~
except the change in the discount rate. For policy-
makers, then, all of Z, is known before the Fed
actually changes the discount rate, while for
market watchers, the Prob(S, = i[z,i is useful
for making inferences conditional on the occur-
rence of a given-sized discount rate change.”
Table 1 gives results from estimating the param-
eters in equations I and 2, ~3and 0. Further
details on the mixture model and its estimation
are in the Appendix.
The prior probabilities for Process I and Pro-
cess 2 are conditioned on the following variables
in the results in table I: a constant; the change
in the discount rate multiplied by the sign of
the previous change; and the unemployment
rate. As an explanatory variable, the change in
the discount rate multiplied by the sign of the
previous change responds to the follo~ving
observation: Generally, large absolute changes in
the discount rate lead to relatively large responses
in the ‘I’-hill rate; exceptions occur, however,
when the discount rate change represents a
change in the direction of the discount rate
(increases to decreases and vice versa). For this
explanatory variable, the relationship between
the absolute magnitude of the discount rate
change and the 1’-bill response will reverse itself
when the direction changes. An alternative
approach %vould be to estimate a separate coeffi-
cient on a change-in-direction dummy variable, but,
given that only eight changes indirection occur in
the sample, the additional coefficient cannot be
“The parameters e represent the derivative of the log of the
odds of Process 1 versus Process 2 with respect to Z.
“Many professional forecasters will present different
forecasts for different “scenarios,” where one scenario
might include an easing in monetary policy accompanied by
a discount rate change of 25 basis points.
Parameter Description Value t-statlstic
~0 Intercept 0018 1.12
p1 Process 1 Response .1449 4.57
p2 Process 2 Response .7743 10.40
° Constant 7.141 3.11
°~ Magnitude and Sign of ADA —4.374 2.77
02 Unemployment Rate —.4633 1.99
00 St. 0ev. Outside 1979-82 .096
01 St. 0ev. During 1979-82 .280
42 When ADA 0 .726estimated precisely.’°The unemployment rate is
included because it might summarize the effects
of real shocks on the economy.1’
The hypothesis that 1~, =fl~ is easily rejected, so
that qualitative differences among discount rate
changes of the same size do indeed cause them
to differ in their effects on the T-bill rate. It is
also useful to interpret the signs of the 0
parameters, all three of which are significantly
different from zero. The positive constant
implies that, other things equal, the low-
response process is more likely to hold. The
negative coefficient on the magnitude variable
implies that increasing the size of the discount
rate change leads to more than a proportionate
increase in the T-bill response, provided that
the change is in the same direction as the previ-
ous one. Thus, perhaps markets interpret 100
basis-point changes in the discount rate as
especially convincing signals of a changing
environment. The negative coefficient on the
unemployment rate indicates that relatively
large responses in the T-bill rate are more likely
when the unemployment rate is high. One
interpretation is that the market believes that
the Fed reacts to high unemployment with
active policy steps to stimulate the economy, so
the market tends to key off discount rate
changes and Process 2 is likely to hold.
In fitting the change in the ‘F-bill rate on the
days the discount rate changes, the mixture
model attains an R2 of .726 (on days when the
discount rate does not change. the H2 is zero
by construction).” Estimation of the ‘I’-hill
response, using the technical/non-technical
classifications from Federal Reserve announce-
ments, results in a lower R of 45933 Further-
tnore, as table 2 shows, the mixture model
provides a superior fit across both the October
1979-October 1982 period, when the Fed targeted
non-borrowed reserves, and the rest of the sample.
Table 2
Sum of Squared Residuals
when ADA 0
Technical/
Sample period Mixture model Non-
technical
Full samp!e 1 837 3.076
1979-1982 1 448 1.936
Outside 1979-1982 390 1 141
The generality of the mixture model, relative
to the technical/non-technical dichotomy, is that
the probability of Process 1 vs. Process 2 can lie
anywhere between zero and one; table 3 shows
that the probabilities of the high-response process
lie between 10 and 90 percent for five responses.
Table 3 also indicates that the differences
between the mixture model and the technical/
non-technical regression derive mainly from the
fact that 33 of the 56 discount changes are non-
technical, yet the estimated probabilities of Pro-
cess 2 determining the T-bill responses in the
mixture model sum only to 12.2, which indi-
cates that non-technical discount rate changes
are considerably heterogeneous with respect to
the market response. ‘This concurs with Thornton
(1991) who notes that the T-bill rate does not
change significantly following some non-technical
changes. Nevertheless, almost all high-response
cases are non-technical, and on only three
occasions did the probability of Process 2, the
high-response case, exceed 0.9 outside of
October 1979-October 1982, the period of non-
borrowed reserves targeting. It is not yet clear,
then, whether the large ‘I’-bill responses between
1979 and 1982 were due to the operating proce-
dure or the abnormally high unemployment
rates. The next section shows that both the
‘°Sucha version of the model was estimated with separate
coefficients for the magnitude and the sign change. Not
surprisingly, the coefficient on the sign-change variable
suggests that changes in direction lead to small responses
in the T-bill rate; with only eight occurrences, however,
the standard error is large, making the point estimate
unreliable. The coefficient on the magnitude of the discount
rate change, which can use all 56 observations, is statis-
tically significant. Overall, both the version reported in the
paper and the one described here give nearly identical
estimates of the response levels and the number of high-
response cases.
11Other variables tried but found not to be significant were
the most recent change in the inflation rate and the growth
rate of industrial production.
“Note that a mixture model with constant prior probabilities
fits almost as well as the one with time-varying prior proba-
bilities. Nevertheless, the prior probabilities do exhibit
statistically significant variation, and by estimating their
co-movements with other variables, we gain some insight
as to what lies behind the T-bill responses.
“This regression follows Thornton (1982) who first documented
that dividing discount rate changes into “technical” and
“non-technical” changes leads to a regression of interest
rate changes on discount rate changes where non-technical
changes are significant and technical changes are insign-
ificant: ATB, = d0+A(L)ATB,~, +d,D,ADR,.+-d2 (1 —0,)
where D, is a dummy variable that equals one
when the discount change is technical. The estimates










response process Non-technical =
1-15-73 0.50 0.030 1.5028E-06 0
2-26-73 0.50 0.210 0.043218 1
4-23-73 0.25 0.060 0.0099814 0
5-11-73 0.25 0.230 0.13455 0
6-11-73 0.50 0.080 0.00061177
7-02-73 0.50 0.380 0.91483 1
8-14-73 0.50 0.230 0.073415 0
4-25-74 0.50 0.190 0.023996
12-09-74 —0.25 —0.180 0.023127 1
1-06-75 —0.50 —0.060 0.0015696 1
2-05-75 —0.50 —0.150 0.029039 0
3-10-75 —0.50 0.060 3.9024E-05 1
5-16-75 —0.25 0.010 0.021211 0
1-19-76 —0.50 —0.080 0.0027500 0
11-22-76 —0.25 —0.060 0.037609 0
8-30-77 0.50 0.020 2.8641E-06 0
10-26-77 0.25 —0.050 0.0038216 0
1-09-78 0.50 0.390 0.96901 1
5-11-78 0.50 —0.070 7.5165E-06 0
7-03-78 0.25 — 0.060 0.0024606 0
8-21-78 0.50 —0.040 1.91566-05 1
9-22-78 0.25 0.110 0.035044 1
10-16-78 0.50 0.060 0.00048244 1
11-01-78 1.00 0.100 1.31746-10 1
7-20-79 0.50 0.160 0.012015 1
8-17-79 0.50 0.060 0.00052925 1
9-19-79 0.50 —0.200 1.0186E-07 0
10-09-79 1.00 1.120 0.99437 1
2-15-80 1.00 0.570 0.75012 1
5-29-80 —1.00 0.220 2.0124E-06 0
6-13-80 —1.00 —0.020 0.076875 0
7-28-80 —1.00 0.160 0.022486 0
9-26-80 1.00 0.460 0.00035858 1
11-17-80 1.00 0.800 0.96824 1
12-05-80 1.00 0.980 0.99060 1
5-05-81 1.00 0.600 0.86819 1
11-02-81 —1.00 —0.060 2.48876-05 0
12-04-81 —1.00 —0.580 0.90221 0
7-20-82 —0.50 —0.400 0.56798 1
8-02-82 —0.50 —0.810 0.86346 1
8-16-82 —0.50 —0.580 0.72376 1
8-27-82 —0.50 0.700 0.019068 0
10-12-82 —0.50 —0.370 0.99147 0
11-22-82 —0.50 —0.140 0.070041 1
12-14-82 —0.50 —0.320 0.96461 1
4-09-84 0.50 —0.090 1.08196-07 0
11-23-84 —0.50 —0.100 4.8352E-05 1
12-24-84 —0.50 —0.130 0.010614 1
5-20-85 —0.50 —0.140 0014009 1
3-07-86 —0.50 —0.080 0.0019898 1
4-21-86 —0.50 0.000 0.00013878 0
7-11-86 —0.50 —0.100 0.0034851 0
8-21-86 —0.50 —0.130 0.0088348 1
9-04-87 0.50 0.190 0.00044880 1
8-09-88 0.50 0.220 0.076418 1
2-24-89 0.50 0.040 0.00018991 1Table 4
Sum of Squared Forecast Errors
Sample
period Forecast 1
operating procedure and the unemployment
rate matter for forecasting.
Substitution of the prior probabilities,
Prob.(S,=i]Z,), into equation 1 for 5, gives one-
step-ahead forecasts for this model. Comparing
the mixture model’s sum of squared forecasts
errors, found in table 4 under forecast 1, with
the sum of squared residuals from the technical/
non-technical regression provides a relative
measure of forecast performance.
‘The mixture model’s forecast I does not fare
well from October 1979-October 1982, although
it performs better than the technical/non-technical
regression outside this period. One interpretation
is that Federal Reserve announcements of
discount rate changes, on which the technical/
non-technical classifications are based, take on
special importance during periods when the Fed
is targeting non-borrowed reserves. To learn
about this, we add a dummy variable, which
equals one when there is a non-technical change
during the 1979-82 period, into Z in the prior
probabilities of equation 2 of the mixture model.”
The sum of squared forecast errors is reported
in table 4 under forecast 2. Knowing whether
the discount change is technical greatly improves
the forecasts between 1979-82. One possible
explanation is that market watchers can directly
observe discrete shifts in Fed policy by watching
the federal funds rate when it is the operating
target. tinder non-borrowed reserves targeting,
however, the funds rate is market-determined,
“Adding a second dummy variable for non-technical changes
outside 1979-82 does not improve the estimates significantly.
“It is easy to formulate in-sample forecasts that suggest, for
example, that people in 1932 should have known that it
so discrete shifts in Fed policy are more likely
to be revealed through the discount rate, there-
by enhancing the informational value of discount
rate changes, as it takes time for shifts in policy
to translate into sustained changes in the rate of
reserves growth.
23
Compared with in-sample forecasting, out-of-
sample forecasting offers a stiffer and more
economically meaningful test of an empirical
model. Thus, it is useful to compare forecasts
from the mixture model and the technical/non-
technical regression for the seven discount rate
changes beginning in December 1990, using the
coefficients estimated over the 1972-89 period.”
Table 5 summarizes the results.
The time-varying prior probabilities of Process 1
vs. Process 2 are clearly illustrated in table 5.
As the unemployment rate increases, the prior
probability of Process 2 increases, perhaps as
markets expect active policy steps from the Fed
to combat recession. Also, the change in Decem-
ber 1991 leads to a much higher prior probabili-
ty of the high-response process, because it was
a change of 100 basis points and the sign of the
discount rate change did not change from the
previous one. The technical/non-technical
regression, in contrast, consistently overpredicts
the ‘I’-bill responses with its characterization
that all non-technical discount rate changes of
the same size should have the same effect on
the T-bill rate.
was a great time to buy stocks. When making real-world
decisions, however, people have to forecast into the very
uncertain future, a fact captured in out-of-sample forecasting.
Technical!
Non-technical Forecast 2
Full sample 3 552 3 076 2 404
19791982 2721 1936 1711
Outside 1979-1982 .831 1.141 .694Table 5
Out-of-Sample Forecasting
Date 12-19-90 2-04-91 4-30-91 9-13-91 11-6-91 12-20-91 7-02-92
Unemployment rate 61 6.5 6.6 6.8 6.9 7.1 7.8
Technical change 0 0 000 0 0
Prior Probability Process I 999 .875 .869 859 .853 .372 .205
Change in Discount Rate -.50 —.50 —.50 —.50 —.50 —10 —50
Change in T-bill Rate — 11 —.02 — 08 - 06 .13 30 31
Technical torecastod AIB - .273 .273 273 - .273 — 273 — .546 — .273
Mixture forecasted ATB - .027 — .064 — .066 — .069 — .070 — .475 — .274
Overall, the mixture model with time-varying
prior probabilities fits the changes in the T-bill
rate better than the technicallnon-technical
regression; it also provides better one-step-ahead
forecasts, given that the prior probabilities use
information about whether the change is
technical or non-technical during periods when
the operating target is non-borrowed reserves.
Furthermore, the variables determining the
prior probabilities of the two response levels
may reveal something about the market’s beliefs
about discount rate policy.
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Previous research has considered that whether
a discount rate change is anticipated or not is a
potentially important factor in determining how
strongly the T-bill rate responds.” In other
words, when market rates do not respond to a
non-technical change in the discount rate, it
might be due to the fact that the market antici-
pated the change and market rates had already
moved before the discount change. The relevance
of this scenario hinges on whether market par-
ticipants can predict with reasonable accuracy both
the timing and magnitude of discount rate changes.
The analysis here will follow the work of
Hakkio and Pearce (1992) by lumping together’
different-sized changes in the discount rate and
concentrating on whether the direction and tim-
ing of changes are predictable.” The distinction
will be that Hakkio and Pearce either estimate
sub-samples of discount rate increases and
decreases separately, or estimate a multinomial
logit model, neither of which recognizes the
ordering inherent in discount rate changes
(decrease, no change, increase). The ordered
probit model employed here takes into account
that the probability of a decrease in the dis-
count rate, relative to the probability of no
change, does not remain constant as the
probability of an increase changes; the multi-
nomial logit requires this assumption.”
Maddala (1983) presents the basic ordered
probit model, written here in terms of discount
rate changes:
(3) Prob.(decreaselX, ,) = F(X,J3)
Prob.(no change]X,,) = F(X~3/3 + c) — F(X,13)
Prob.(increase[X, ,) = 1— F(X,/3 + c)
where X1 is a vector of information available
at time t— 1, F(-) is the cumulative normal
density function and ci sapositive constant.
Furthermore, rather than view the anticipated!
unanticipated dichotomy as an alternative to
“Examples are Thornton (1986, 1991), Roley and Troll (1984),
Smirlock and Yawitz (1985), and Hakkio and Pearce (1992).
“This restriction is simply due to a lack of a sufficient
number of 25, 50, and 100 basis-point increases and decreases
to allow for full separation of discount changes based on
their sizes. Smirlock and Yawitz (1985), on the other hand,
obtain an estimate of the expected change in the discount
rate, not only the prior probability of a change. This comes
at a cost, however, because their model does not consider
the discrete nature of discount rate changes, i.e., their
model ignores the fact that the Fed always changes the
discount rate by a minimum of 25 basis points, which
effectively makes the likelihood of a discount rate change
trivially small in many time periods.
“Applications of the multinomial logit model are often
criticized for assuming an “independence of irrelevant
alternatives” when this property fails to hold for the choices
being modeled. See Maddala (1983) for some examples.technical/non-technical as Smirlock and Yawitz
(1985) do, we can estimate the market’s responses
to polychotomous discount rate changes: antici-
pated technical increases in the discount rate;
anticipated non-technical decreases; unanticipated
technical changes; etc. In all there are eight
different responses, as outlined in table 6.
Hence, the hypothesis that anticipations of
discount rate changes do not significantly move
the T-Bill rate cannot he rejected if a,= a,=a, =a,
=0 cannot be rejected. The model imposes
symmetrical responses for unanticipated increases
and decreases in the discount rate simply due
to sample-size constraints. With only 23 and 33
technical and non-technical changes, respectively,
it is not possible to obtain good estimates of
separate coefficients for either unanticipated
technical increases and decreases or unanticipated
non-technical increases and decreases.
The sequential nature of the model means
that we first use time t — I information to esti-
mate the respective probabilities of a decrease,
no change or an increase in the discount rate at
time t. Then, given the direction of the discount
rate change, we use time t — I information to
estimate the probabilities of technical and non-
technical changes in the discount rate. Together
these prior probabilities give the prior proba-
bility of a technical discount rate increase:
(4) Probability (tech.increaseF X, )
= Prob.(increasel X,,)
x Prob.(tech.change~ increase, X,,,,)
The objective here is to regress changes in
the T-bill rate on the prior probabilities of dis-
count rate changes, such as the one in equation
4, to see whether market interest rates react to
changing anticipations of discount rate changes.”
Estimates from this model help determine
which explanatory variables are useful in
predicting discount rate changes and to what
extent discount rate changes are predictable.’°
The results from estimating equation 3 with






Industrial Proc~uct,on --27.94 3.88
Unemployment Rate .265 5.00
Constam fc) 434 24.11
iiltIi ate that discount rate changes are some-
what predictable in a qualitative sense; figures 1
and 2 show that the prior probability of a
discount rate decrease or increase often peaks
near the actual changes, but it never reaches
one-half. Significant explanatory variables for
the discount rate changes are the spread between
the repurchase rate and the discount rate,
“We say anticipations of discount rate changes” and not
“anticipated discount rate changes,” because the model
should include the effect on the T-bill rate of cases in
which a discount change seemed likely, but none occurred.
The estimates of Smirlock and Yawitz (1985) and Thornton
(1991) do not fully account for unfulfilled anticipations of
discount rate changes.
“The variables tried had been suggested in Hakkio and
Pearce (1992).
Table 6









Anticipated O~ 02 03 0~
Unarii’cipaled 05 -~0. 6
- T-Bill Responses to Anticipated
Discount Rate Changestechnical/non-technical classifications, it mnight
appear that anticipations of discount rate
changes have an effect on the ‘I-bill rate. It is
unclear, however, whether this result holds
when we use the mixture model’s classifications.
Consequently, we repeat the exercise using a
binary variable generated from the posterior
probabilities from the mixture model, whereby
a discount rate change is classified as coming
from Process 2 if the Prob.(Process 2IATB) 0.5.
Only the dependent binary variable (Process
1/Process 2) changes from the previous analysis;
the probabilities of discount rate changes from
the ordered probit still apply. Table 10 contains
new estimates of the T-bill response coefficients.
With the mixture model classifications, the
timing of discount rate changes does not appear
to be sufficiently predictable to uncover’ evi-
dence that anticipations of discount changes
lead to movements in the ‘F-bill rate. In table
10, no coefficient on an anticipated variable
is significant, and the F1 statistic for joint
significance is only 1.77, which is less than the
95 percent critical value of 2.37. We conclude
that the timing of a discount i-ate change is
difficult to predict, even at the weekly horizon,
amid anticipations of discount rate changes do
not appear to be major determinants of move-
ments in the ‘I-bill rate, especially when classi-
fving the discount rate changes as high- or
low-response changes.
This paper presents a mixture model of two
levels of ‘I-hill responses to discount rate changes.
All of the model’s results are compared with
results obtained from classifying discount rate
changes as technical or non-technical, which
is the standard approach in the literature.
The mixture model yields superior results with
the single exception of forecasting T-bill
responses during the 1979-82 period of non-
borrowed reserves targeting. Conditioning the
mixture model’s forecasts on whether the dis-
count change is technical or non-technical from
1979-82 remedies this shortcomning. Moreover
the mixture model is well-suited to forecasting
because it derives prior probabilities for each
response level, which policymakers and market
participants can use to analyze the likely





























Estimates of the market’s responses to discount
rate changes are consistent with the idea that
the market believes in several stylized facts.
First, discount rate changes of larger absolute
magnitudes appear to generate proportionately
larger responses in the T-bill rate. Second, markets
look for the Fed to respond actively when the
Table 8
Probability of Technical vs. Non-technical
Variable (;
Discount Rate Increases Discount Rate Decreases
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Intercept — .626 .323 1.71 .794
Spread .119 .412 —1.29 2.273
Ml Growth Rate 8.48 1.32 2.61 .494
Industrial Production Growth —38.24 .654 30.73 .823




Intercept — .037 I 85
Spread 047 2 47
Unanticipated Process 2 .826 6.03
Unanticipated Process 1 .174 .833
Anticipated Process 2 Decrease 785 1.230
Anticipated Process 1 Decrease — .217 .547
Anticipated Process 2 Increase 516 .831
Anticipated Process 1 Increase - 273 .168
unemployment rate is high. Third, discuunt nile
policy apparently becomes an important source
of information transmission during periods of
non-borrowed reserves targeting. This is prob-
ably because discrete shifts in Fed policy are
not revealed through the federal funds rate
under non-borrowed reserves targeting, thereby
boosting the status of Federal Reserve announce-
ments of discount rate changes as indicators of
shifts in monetary policy. The technical/non-
technical dichotomy is much less able to separate
these individual influences behind the market
response to discount rate changes. Furthermore,
the mixture model provides an econometric
framework within which such stylized facts can
be quantified to further our understanding of
when and why some discount rate changes will
have a significant impact on market interest
rates.
The second half of the paper uses a sequential
ordered probit model, an econometric model
that is arguably more suited to estimating the
extent to which discount rate changes can be
anticipated than ones used previously in the
literature. The estimates are consistent with
Smirlock and Yawitz (1985) in that anticipations
of discount rate changes might appear to affect
the ‘F-bill rate when the changes are classified
as technical or non-technical. The evidence,
ipations of discount rate changes when we use
the mixture model to classify the discount rate
changes.
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(September 1991). however, does not support such a role for antic-An intuitive method of estimating mixture
models with unknown sample separation across
the different processes is the Expectation-
Maximization (EM) algorithm of Dempster, Laird
and Rubin (1977). Following the EM algorithm,
we write the joint density of the change in the
T-bill rate and the unobserved state, 5,, condi-
tional on Z, as
(Al) f(ATB,, S,=fiZ,) =
~(ATBjS,=j) Prob. (S,=fiZ,), j=0,l.
‘faking logs and differentiating with respect to
y = (/3, 0, a) in Al, we obtain scores of the log-
likelihood under the assumption that the changes
in the T-bill rate are normally distributed, so
that when ~ denotes the normal density function,
the probability-weighted scores to be set to zero
are
12 0I n f(ATB,, S,=OJZ,)
(A2) ~ [Prob. (S,=0~ATB,)
3 In f(ATB, S,=1JZ)
+ Prob. (S,=l~ATB,) t
The variance a, is assumed to take on either of
two values:
a, = a~if t E (Oct. 1979-Oct. 1982)
= o,, otherwise.
Hence, the model allows for a, a~,reflecting
the greater volatility of interest rates experi-
enced under the Fed’s non-borrowed reserves
operating procedure from October 1979 until
October 1982. In the case where changes in the
3)’
T-bill rate are not normally distributed, the esti-
mates are still consistent, but not as efficient as
they would be if the true density were known
and maximized. Furthermore, Hamilton (1990)
has shown that disturbances to real GNP growth
appear more homoscedastic and normal when
modelled with a non-linear, state-switching model
than with a linear model.





+Prob. (S,= IIZ,)#(ATB,IS, = ii]
The EM algorithm calls for the following steps to
he taken in the estimation of (/3, 0, a):
Step I
Given starting values of the parameters, calcu-
late Prob.(S,=0]ATB~)using Bayes’ Law.
Step 2
Find (/3, 0, a) which sets the probability-
weighted scores equal to zero.
Step 3
With new estimates of (/3, 0, a), update the
estimates of Prob.(S,=0]ATB,).
Step 4
Iterate over 2 and 3 until convergence.